What went wrong — but actually right — this election
These errors prove the system works as intended
During the canvassing process in Michigan, election officials identified 26,000 votes in four counties that had not been initially reported on election night, largely due to human error. These votes were caught during the canvass and added to the state’s final tally, ensuring the choices of all voters were included. As a result, the outcome of several races changed from the earlier unofficial tally.
Across the country this election, we saw a handful of instances like this one in Michigan where errors were caught by the robust checks and balances built into the election administration process — errors that were quickly rectified within that process. In these spots where things went “wrong” — whether due to human error or machine error — the checks built into administration processes were able to catch them, as intended, and quickly correct them to ensure accurate results. This occurrence in Michigan showcases the importance of the canvassing process in catching errors in unofficial results to ensure that final results are accurate. Election systems are designed with layers of checks and balances to make sure that the eventual outcomes reflect the choice of the voters.
In a system run by thousands of humans and involving hundreds of millions of voters, errors are inevitable. And while hard-working and dedicated election administrators do admirable work to minimize these errors, mistakes do happen. This is why in every state there are fail-safes built into the post-vote counting and certification processes.
Understanding these processes in detail and monitoring their use during the post-vote period is critical to combatting the rampant spread of misinformation and the growth of election denialism across the country. That’s why we believe so deeply in our mission to shed light on what happens after votes are cast — to understand these systems, promote transparency, and monitor post-vote activity helps fight back against misinformation and the erosion of trust in our democratic processes.
Another example of the canvass at work was seen in Macomb County, MI, where during the canvass in the week following the election, the Board of County Canvassers requested that roughly 33,000 absentee ballots be re-tabulated. Due to an incorrect setting on the tabulator, ballots containing “overvotes” were not properly flagged by the tabulator for adjudication during initial tabulation. While only a small portion of the ballots — an estimated 1,000— were affected by this error, all 33,000 ballots were re-tabulated to ensure that every vote was counted correctly. The re-tabulation did not cause a significant delay in Macomb County’s canvass, and the county was able to meet the state deadline for counties to complete the process. The event showcases the canvassing process working as intended to identify and address human error during tabulation.
A similar instance took place in Milwaukee, WI, where election officials re-tabulated more than 30,000 absentee ballots because workers did not properly secure the tabulators during initial tabulation. While there was no evidence that the machines were compromised, the re-tabulation was a bipartisan agreement done out of an abundance of caution even though it delayed reporting of Milwaukee’s results. The election administration processes had a built-in check to ensure the votes were accurately counted and election administrators availed use of the system. Despite the bipartisan agreement to re-tabulate votes, losing Senate candidate Eric Hovde still used the re-tabulation to cast doubt on the election results by elevating conspiracies about “last-minute absentee ballots that were dropped in Milwaukee at 4 a.m., flipping the outcome” — cynically referencing the votes Milwaukee election officials agreed to recount.
Another example took place in Calhoun County, MI, where the Board of County Canvassers identified a programming error that resulted in about half of absentee ballots from Battle Creek not being included in the initial unofficial result uploaded. The Board of County Canvassers discovered the error within days of the election (on the first day of county canvassing) and re-tabulated the ballots to address the issue. The newly tabulated results narrowed the margins in the state House race, and the Republican candidate sued the Board of County Canvassers asking the court to stop the re-tabulation. His Democratic opponent argued that the Board of County Canvassers was acting within its scope to correct errors made during initial tabulation. A Circuit Court judge denied the Republican candidate’s request to bar re-tabulation on November 13, and the canvassing process was completed within the state deadline. Once again, this incident demonstrates the canvassing process working as intended to identify and address errors and ensure accurate results are reported.
Much has been said about the incorrect use of hand counts, but when a ballot printing issue prevented voting machines across Cambria County, PA precincts from accepting voters’ ballots, county officials implemented a rarely used provision of the Election Code to hand count those ballots due to the impracticality of using the automatic tabulating equipment. This resource- and time-intensive process, which took more than three days to complete, was a correct use of using hand counts to combat a legitimate challenge in the counting process. Nonetheless, the extra time and resource needs clearly illustrate why large scale hand counts are impractical and should not be the default counting method.
We also saw the system working as intended in regards to state oversight of the election administration process in ensuring compliance with state election law. In Apache County, AZ, there was a systemic issue with ballot-on-demand printers at polling locations on election day. At one point, county election officials were improperly turning voters away from polls because the polling machines were down. The Arizona Secretary of State stepped in to prevent officials from turning away voters, showing the importance of state oversight in ensuring compliance with election law. Ultimately, the Apache County Superior Court ordered polling hours extended until 9 p.m. at the nine affected polling locations. State oversight also played an important role in Washoe County, NV, where though County Commissioner Jeanne Herman (once again) illegally voted against certifying the 2024 election results. Her vote was not successful in delaying or derailing the county’s certification. The effective oversight and enforcement actions from the state during the primary, when a majority of commissioners voted against certification, combined with the outcome of the election, ensured the majority of Washoe commissioners voted to certify the results for the general election in a timely manner.
Dismissal of mass voter challenges was another area where the election system worked as intended, as seen in examples from Pennsylvania and Nevada. Leading up to the election, more than 4,000 Pennsylvania voter's eligibility to cast mail-in ballots in 15 counties were challenged by activists associated with election denial. All of these challenges were summarily dismissed by the respective County Board of Elections, including both Republican and Democratic controlled Boards, or were withdrawn by the petitioners. Many of these challenges brazenly targeted legally registered overseas voters, all U.S. citizens including some military personnel, who are permitted by federal law to cast “UOCAVA” or Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act mail-in ballots. In Nevada earlier this year, we also saw a conservative group challenge the eligibility of more than 30,000 voters. In August, the Secretary of State issued guidance clarifying Nevada law that makes mass challenges unlikely to have legal standing in Nevada. In response, another conservative group (led by the same individual) filed lawsuits to force counties to process the challenges. These lawsuits were withdrawn in October. Another, unrelated lawsuit challenging the registration involving 50 addresses remains ongoing in Washoe County. In both Pennsylvania and Nevada some challenges were based on what was a possibly illegal use of the U.S. Postal Service database to try to challenge voters whose addresses in that database didn’t match their mail-in ballot request file. However, this database is not intended for this purpose and there are many legitimate reasons for this mismatch. Therefore, personal knowledge or other actual evidence of an inaccurate voting address – which none of these challengers could provide – is required to sustain this kind of a challenge.
Through these checks and balances built into election administration processes, election officials spot errors that can almost always be remedied while maintaining the integrity of the count. However, occasionally issues do occur that, despite the best efforts of election workers, can’t be fixed without cancelling ballots due to issues unrelated to any fault of the voter themselves. For example, after a printing error combined with a failure to properly segregate returned ballots in Luzerne, PA, the county had to throw out 1,301 ballots in order to avoid double counting, thereby disenfranchising 142 voters who had not been able to recast new ballots. We know that election officials do everything they can to avoid this, but sometimes it’s the least bad outcome so long as those cancelled ballots are not outcome determinative.
It would be easy for some to point to all of the instances above as an election administration process riddled with errors and use that to bolster anti-democracy, election denialism talking points, like was done by Senate candidate Eric Hovde in Milwaukee. But that misses the real story. Instead of a sign of a failure of the system, these examples are illustrative of the system working as intended — our complex (sometimes maddeningly so) election administration system delivering outcomes that reflects the will of the voters.
This is why it is so critical that we understand how our election administration systems work and monitor the processes as they happen. That’s how we instill trust, showcase the hard-working election administration who make these systems possible, and to combat misinformation that seeks to erode the foundation of our democracy.